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This paper explores the distributional effects of contractionary monetary policy by race 
and gender in the US from 1979-2008 using state-level panel data. We hypothesize that 
women and Blacks, as groups with less power and lower status in the social hierarchy, 
fare worse in the competition over jobs, resulting in a disproportionate rise in female and 
Black unemployment rates relative to White males. We also investigate the possibility 
that Blacks bear a greater burden of joblessness than females as Black population density 
rises. Results indicate the costs of fighting inflation are unevenly distributed amongst 
workers, weighing more heavily on Black females and Black males, followed by White 
females, and lastly, White males.  
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 Contractionary monetary policy and the dynamics of US race and 
gender stratification  
 
I. Introduction 
Central banks across the globe have shifted the emphasis of monetary policy to an almost 
singular concern with controlling inflation over the goal of employment generation.
1 The 
primary instrument in the central banker’s toolkit is nominal interest rates, designed to act 
on the demand-side of the economy by slowing consumption and investment. The cost of 
controlling inflation via this method is an increase in unemployment.  
  Inflation targeting as a policy stance has been criticized on several grounds. In 
developing countries especially, inflation tends to be the result of supply-side bottlenecks 
rather than excess aggregate demand. That structural feature of developing countries 
inhibits the effectiveness of inflation targeting and raises the social costs of reducing 
inflation rates. Further, even when inflation is a demand-induced phenomenon, a body of 
evidence suggests that inflation rates below 15-20 percent are not harmful to growth, 
particularly in developing countries, suggesting central banks could do much more to 
reduce unemployment than they currently are doing (Pollin and Zhu, 2006).  
  A third concern, one we explore here, is that the costs of inflation are unevenly 
distributed. Contractionary monetary policy can exacerbate gender and racial inequalities 
if subordinate groups experience a disproportionate share of the resulting job losses. 
Weaker power and status in the social hierarchy may result in women and ethnic 
subordinate groups (acknowledging the overlap of these two groups) faring worse in the 
competition over jobs relative to White men during economic downturns.
2 Unequal 
effects may be transmitted indirectly in ways that reflect structural features of gender and 
racial hierarchies. Women and people of color tend to be concentrated in more precarious 
forms of employment with temporary, part-time, or contingent jobs more likely to be 
eliminated when demand falls. Racial and gender effects of disinflationary policy also 
result from social stratification, whereby norms and stereotypes identify men, and in 
particular, White men as more deserving of jobs when jobs are scarce, ratifying both 
gender and racial hierarchies.  
  1 Empirical  investigations  of the gender and racial (African Americans and Whites 
in the US) effects of contractionary monetary policy have employed a variety of 
methodologies, most frequently Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques. Most studies 
investigate effects either by gender or by race but not both. A consistent finding in that 
research is that African Americans bear a heavier burden of joblessness relative to Whites 
in response to interest rate hikes. In contrast, the gender-focused research has yielded 
contradictory results. One study, using a developing country sample, finds evidence that 
women’s relative disadvantage in job access in response to contractionary monetary 
policy episodes (Braunstein and Heintz 2008). Results from empirical analyses of 
developed countries are contradictory. While Tachtamanova and Sierminska (2009) 
found no such effects for OECD countries, Heintz and Seguino (2009) found evidence 
that women in the US face more job losses than men in response to contractionary 
monetary policy.  
  Previous research has not considered the interaction of race and gender 
hierarchies in job rationing in response to contractionary monetary policy.
3 As a result, 
we know little about job competition between these two subordinate groups in response 
to contractionary monetary policy. It is possible that the intensity of the gender effect 
depends on the share of the ethnic subordinate group in the population in any given 
geographic region, with women’s job losses attenuated as Black population density rises. 
If such evidence does exist, it would imply the existence of a “nested” hierarchy whereby 
race trumps gender as a social marker during hard economic times. Further, if the ethnic 
share of the population does influence women’s job losses relative to White men’s, 
failure to identify consistent gender effects in some previous research may be an artifact 
of the aggregate level of analysis.   
  To investigate how these social dynamics play out in the context of race and 
gender competition over jobs, we employ a state-level panel data set to empirically 
estimate the determinants of Black/White male and female/White male unemployment 
rate ratios. We disaggregate further to also consider the determinants unemployment of 
subgroups relative to White men, specifically Black women, Black men, and White 
women. Although it would be desirable to expand the analysis to include Hispanics and 
  2Asians, data limitations would have resulted in an unacceptably small number of 
observations.  
The goals of the empirical analysis are three-fold. First, we seek to determine 
whether the methodological approach we utilize yields results consistent results with 
previous research indicating that the costs of contractionary monetary policy are 
unevenly distributed between ethnic groups. Our approach differs in that White males 
represent the dominant group, while previous studies include White women and men. 
Second, we capitalize on the variation of the share of African Americans in the 
population at the state level to explore the possibility that race is a more salient factor in 
allocating scarce jobs than gender. We do this by evaluating the effect of Black 
population density on the female/White male unemployment ratio, hypothesizing that the 
size of the effect is inversely related to Black population share.  
Third, we explore the data to determine whether, at critical levels, Black 
population density triggers a shift in White attitudes consistent with either threat or 
contact theory, and examine the consequences of these dynamics with regard to the 
response of women’s relative unemployment to monetary policy. Threat theory postulates 
that increases in Black population density can intensify racialist group identity in 
response to Whites’ perceived threat to their group position. This could generate 
intensification of racial norms and stereotypes, resulting in Blacks bearing a greater 
burden of the increase in unemployment than Whites in response to contractionary 
monetary policy. Conversely, contact theory suggests that greater contact, measured as 
Black population density, weakens the propensity for discrimination on the part of 
Whites, resulting in a lower unemployment rate gap between Blacks and Whites.  
  Anticipating the results of this analysis, we find that women and Blacks are more 
likely to experience increases in unemployment than White men in response to 
contractionary monetary policy. Those effects are more negative for Blacks than women, 
and for Black women than White women. We also find evidence that the relationships 
between relative unemployment rates and our key monetary policy variable vary with the 
Black share of the population. These findings are important for macroeconomic 
policymaking and, more specifically, monetary policy. The evidence underscores that 
macroeconomic policy is neither race- nor gender-neutral. Apart from the inherent 
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to distributional effects of macroeconomic policies can produce negative long-run 
consequences for the economy in terms of lost productivity.  
 
II. The distributional effects of contractionary monetary policy 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a shift in central bank policy from a dual concern with 
both employment and inflation to an almost exclusive focus on keeping inflation low and 
close to zero (Epstein and Yeldan 2008). The change in policy emphasis has occurred in 
both developed and developing economies. The distributional effects of inflation 
targeting are of great interest in the context of widening income and wealth gaps within 
and between countries over the last three decades (ILO 2008). Here we focus on 
employment outcomes as one of the central ways in which monetary policy impacts 
inequalities in income and economic opportunity. 
  The primary tool used in inflation targeting is the manipulation of short-term 
interest rates (in the US, the federal funds rate) charged to banks. Interest rate changes are 
intended to work on the demand side of the economy. In the US, an increase in the 
federal funds rate raises the cost of lending to banks, thereby reducing borrowing for 
investment and consumption and thus aggregate spending. The effects of contractionary 
policy on employment are summarized in the concept of the sacrifice ratio, measured as 
the percentage decline in employment (alternatively, output) in response to a one percent 
decline in the rate of inflation.    
  A critical question is whether the impacts of interest rate-induced economic 
contractions vary systematically by gender and race. William Greider (1987), in a series 
of interviews with former Federal Reserve Bank members of the Board of Governors 
found they believed their policies to be distributionally neutral and their decisions, rather 
than rewarding one group or another, simply pursued their vision of sound 
macroeconomic management. Abell (1991) argues that although Federal Reserve reaction 
functions appear to only emphasize aggregate concerns – price stability, unemployment 
rates, and interest rates – the sociological makeup of the Fed (White male elites) can lead 
them to privilege the interests of the wealth holding class and ignore negative 
  4distributional effects on men and women of color. Of course, the Fed’s actions do not 
produce direct distributional effects; those are transmitted via the impact of interest rate 
changes on business and consumer borrowing, and as a result, on employers’ decisions 
on whom to hire or fire in response to changes in demand.  
In racially- and gender-equitable societies, race and gender differences in the 
probability of unemployment across business cycles would not exist, although individual 
probabilities of being unemployed might vary, stemming from differences in human 
capital and the elasticity of product demand that would result in differential effects across 
industries and occupations. For example, employers may find it profitable to retain more 
skilled workers when shedding labor. And, interest rate hikes and subsequent declines in 
aggregate demand may differentially affect occupations and industries. Systematic 
intergroup differences in human capital and job concentration do exist, however, 
indicative of processes of group stratification that can explain at least a portion of race 
and gender differences in layoffs during downturns. Racial job competition models and 
evidence as well as a large body of gender research find people of color and women from 
dominant ethnic groups tend to be crowded into jobs and industries with low wages and 
benefits, characterized by employment volatility and absence of opportunities to move up 
the job ladder (Bonacich 1972; Hartmann 1976; Mason 1995, 1999; Standing 1989; 
Williams 1987, 1993; Williams and Kenison 1996). Job competition that slots 
subordinate groups for less stable jobs in lower-wage industries may indirectly contribute 
to differential gender and racial unemployment effects in response to interest rate hikes.  
Several studies further suggest that overt discrimination is a cause of unequal 
unemployment rates by race and gender. For example, research on the cyclical patterns of 
employment has found that less than half of the Black-White male unemployment gap in 
the US can be attributed to observable factors other than race (Holcombe 1988; Stratton 
1993; Sundstrom 1997). Similarly, Azmat, Guell, and Manning’s (2004) investigation of 
female-male unemployment gaps in OECD countries fails to find support for human 
capital-related explanations. The authors did find, however, a correlation between gender 
gaps in unemployment and attitudes on men’s are deservingness of work when jobs are 
scarce, suggesting that hierarchical gender norms and stereotypes contribute to women’s 
greater likelihood of experiencing unemployment during recessions. In a study of three 
  5large Caribbean economies (Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago), Seguino 
(2003) provides evidence that women are the last to be hired during economic upturns, 
controlling for female and male labor supply and industry. The tendency to hire men first 
in upturns is evident even in female-dominated industries. Rives and Sosin (2002) find 
that US women’s unemployment rates are consistently higher than men’s within 
occupations, but the gender distribution across occupations results in lower economy-
wide unemployment rates for women during downturns.  
  Another body of research explicitly considers the impact of contractionary 
monetary policy by race and gender. Several studies, using VAR techniques, find that 
contractionary monetary policy has unequal impacts on unemployment or employment by 
race (Abell 1991; Thorbecke 2001; Carpenter and Rodgers 2004; Rodgers 2007), 
Thorbecke (2001) speculates that differentially negative effects on Blacks may be due to 
“ladder effects,” wherein less skilled workers are laid off first due to firm investment in 
training of higher skilled workers, or a ratcheting upward of employers’ selectivity, a less 
costly choice during recessions.
4 Further, lower wage workers may also have less 
bargaining power in contrast to higher wage workers who are better able to protect their 
jobs during economic hard times. Another factor is discrimination in job access, likely to 
intensify in a labor market with job shortages as racial norms and stereotypes come into 
play in the job rationing process.  
  Evidence on the gendered impact of disinflationary policy is less consistent.  
Braunstein and Heintz (2008) find a negative impact on women’s employment relative to 
men’s in developing countries, using a method that examines outcomes following 
inflationary episodes. In contrast, Tachtamanova and Sierminska’s (2009) recent study of 
OECD countries finds no evidence of systematic gender differences in unemployment 
rates. Heintz and Seguino (2009), however, obtained evidence that Blacks and women 
differentially suffer unemployment relative to Whites and males, respectively, in 
response to increases in the US federal funds rate. Their approach, novel in this literature, 
is to estimate a four-equation system that includes a Philips curve, a central bank reaction 
function, the aggregate unemployment rate, and unemployment Black/White 
(female/male) unemployment rate ratio equations. 
  6  Absent in the existing body of research is a consideration of how job competition 
between women and people of color plays out during periods of job scarcity due to 
contractionary monetary policy.
5 Is there evidence of “nested” hierarchies with either 
women or Blacks at the back of the job queue? That is, do structures of gender or of 
racial stratification dominate in situations of job scarcity?  
 
III. Stratification by Race and Gender: Complements, Substitutes, or Unrelated? 
 
Racial stratification: The reproduction of race identity, norms and stereotypes 
To understand the interaction of racial and gender hierarchies in labor markets, we 
consider here the emerging literatures on the economics of identity and stratification, 
which offer a framework for theorizing about how race and gender hierarchies interact in 
labor markets in response to job shortages. We then integrate insights from the 
psychological and sociological literatures on prejudicial group attitudes.  
  A key theoretical argument is that racial identities are produced goods, responsive 
to shifts in the social and economic costs and benefits of holding such identities (Darity, 
Mason, and Stewart 2006). In the case of race (gender identity is discussed below), 
individuals sort along a continuum between two extreme identity formations, racialized 
and individualist. Racialists choose to identify with their own social group, and engage in 
collective action with those of similar identity to limit the outside group’s access to and 
control over resources. They may do this explicitly by limiting job access, for example, 
or implicitly, by inculcating and perpetuating norms and stereotypes that shape that shape 
perceptions of “deservingness.” In contrast, individualists, as described by Darity, 
Mason, and Stewart (2006), have weak group identification and are willing to forgo 
status rewards that accrue to group conformity. Individualists eschew race identification 
as a means to assess deservingness in access to and control over material resources. The 
share of the population that identify as racialists or individualists responds to changes in 
material rewards for group identification. 
We can hypothesize that as the net benefits of group identification rise, the share 
of the population identifying as racialists will increase, with accentuated racialist norms 
that translate into discriminatory behavior in evidence. Macro-level influences may thus 
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altering the costs and benefits of group identity. Jobs are a prized economic asset, and job 
scarcity is likely to accentuate the incentive of the dominant group to use racialized 
norms to improve their position in the job queue.  
We might thus expect that during economic booms that produce broadly shared 
increases in income and employment opportunities, the share racialists in the population 
will decline since the costs of holding an individualist identify decrease. In contrast, 
economic contractions may lead to an increase in the share of racialists in the population, 
palpably measured as a rise in discrimination in job access. Sustained economic 
contractions or stagnation might be expected to lead to racial hysteresis effects, resulting 
in a larger share of racialists in the population as has emerged in Europe during the recent 
years of high unemployment and accentuated by the global crisis of 2008.
6 
Population density of the subordinate group may have also act as a longer run 
macro-level factor that determines the share of the dominant group with racialized 
identities. Holding constant other macro-level conditions (including rules on property 
ownership, legal consequences of discriminatory behavior, and so forth), the higher the 
population density of the subordinate group, the greater the perceived benefit to the 
dominant group of a racialized identity, which serves to limit competition over material 
resources.  
 
Contact and threat theory offer hypotheses that describe special cases of the dominance 
of individualist or racialist identity norms.
7 Contact theory is associated with the work of 
Gordon Allport (1954) who held that race prejudice is an idiosyncratic individual 
attitude, based on factually incorrect stereotypes which develop from the human 
propensity to categorize and summarize information. Allport proposed structured contact 
on equal footing, sanctioned and supported by some institutional authority, as a means to 
overcome prejudice. Contact theory’s basic premise is that increases in intergroup 
contact, under structurally equitable conditions, should lead to a revision of faulty 
stereotypes, reducing White prejudice against Blacks.  
  Challenges to Allport’s contact theory emerged early on. Herbert Blumer (1958) 
posited that race prejudice is not simply an individual state of mind, but rather, reflects a 
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privileges and advantages in certain areas, as well as fear that the subordinate group will 
threaten those advantages, undergird this prejudice. Following on Blumer’s work,  
Blalock (1967) advanced a theory of group threat or competition (also called the 
visibility-discrimination hypothesis) to explain why racial inequality is higher in 
geographic areas with large concentrations of Blacks. The latter approach has led to a 
large body of work on threat theory, evaluating the conditions under which Whites 
perceive Blacks a threat to White sense of group privilege.  
  Contact and threat theory reflect opposing predictions about the impact of 
interracial contact on the tendency to discriminate against Blacks. A possible resolution 
to these apparently contradictory theories is explored in a number of studies that find 
“threshold” effects, with prejudice initially declining (increased contact causes Whites to 
revise negative stereotypes) and then rising (the threat of competition is accentuated) as 
Black population share rises (Forman 2003; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Taylor 1998). 
Evidence of a concave function is contradicted, however, by evidence that the threat 
effect dominates at low percentages of Blacks in the population, and contact theory holds 
sway at higher Black population shares.
 8 This suggests a convex function of prejudice 
plotted against the percentage of Blacks in the population. These results suggest that we 
may expect to find non-linearities in the relationship between monetary policy variables 
and race-based employment outcomes and that it may be critical to examine multiple 
thresholds in this regard. 
  As compared with attitudinal measures of prejudice, these findings on material 
outcomes suggest a positive (linear) relationship between Black share of the population 
and racial economic inequality. There has, however, been little discussion of threshold 
effects in this body of work that has been so prevalent in attitudinal studies. For the 
purposes of the current study, we posit that if negative threat effects undermine the 
benefits of contact under conditions of job scarcity, the impact of contractionary 
monetary policy will be more racially in evidence. This implies the hypothesis that the 
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Similar to racial identity formation, gender identities may fall along a continuum from 
masculinist to gender egalitarian. A masculinist identity reflects a patriarchal stance on 
gender relations, with adherents engaging in implicit or explicit collective action to 
ensure disproportionate economic and social power accrues to males (Braunstein 2008). 
Gender egalitarians, in contrast, adhere to norms that do not privilege one gender’s 
resource control over another’s.  
  Masculinists use their material and power advantage to maintain their preferential 
position in the construction of gender ideology, norms and stereotypes that justify 
inequality (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1989). Conditions of resource scarcity might 
intensify the prevalence of masculinist identities among the population, leading to greater 
discrimination in job access. For the purposes of this study, we accordingly hypothesize 
that contractionary monetary policy leads to increases in the female to White male 
unemployment rate ratio. 
  How do tendencies towards race and gender stratification and inequality interact, 
particularly under conditions of job scarcity? Gender and racial discrimination could be 
seen as complements, such that all women and Black men face relatively similar 
disadvantages in job access during economic downturns. 
  There is, however, evidence of job competition between White women and 
Blacks. Waldinger (1997) cites research indicating that employers make hiring decisions 
based on a hierarchy of race/ethnic preferences with Whites (including White women) at 
the top followed by Hispanics and Blacks. In interviews with employers, Moss and Tilly 
(2001) also find a preference for hiring White women over other groups in labor markets 
where job skills have risen, with Blacks perceived more negatively.  
  These studies suggest the plausibility of “nested” hierarchies of unemployment 
contingent on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity at the state level. More specifically, 
dominant groups (White men) may prefer to allocate joblessness to racially subordinate 
groups than to women of the dominant ethnic group. A rationale for this preference 
ranking is offered by a Black supervisor in Button and Rienzo (2002: 16): “Hiring White 
women is a White man’s way of making sure Whites stay on top.” White male racialists 
have a material incentive to shift the burden of joblessness to Black men and women over 
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discrimination, race may well invoke a greater penalty than gender.  
  The dynamics of race and gender stratification discussed here suggest three 
testable hypotheses. The first is that Blacks and (all) women fare worse relative to White 
men when contractionary monetary decisions raise the policy interest rate, creating 
conditions of job scarcity. We also test for the possibility that Black women are more 
negatively affected by contractionary monetary policy than White women. Second, to the 
extent threat effects influence outcomes, we hypothesize that the Black/White 
unemployment rate ratio is positively correlated with Black population density. Third, we 
explore the possibility that racial hierarchies dominate gender hierarchies by assessing 
the impact of Black share of the population on the ratio of female to White male 
unemployment rates.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis 
The modeling approach 
The empirical model we construct has the primary goal of assessing the distributional 
impact of contractionary monetary policy on Blacks and women relative to White men. 
We test effects by gender and race separately, using as the dependent variable the ratio of 
all female to White male unemployment rates and Black to White male unemployment 
rates, respectively. Employing a panel data set of U.S. states, we are able to take into 
account fixed effects, that is, unobserved state-level differences that may influence 
outcomes.
10 For example, gender effects may be more pronounced in states where 
conservative religions (and thus norms that define traditional gender roles) dominate, and 
states in the Deep South may be more resistant to racial equality in employment than 
other regions. 
  We focus the analysis on one of the primary monetary policy instruments used by 
the Federal Reserve: the federal funds rate, the interest rate on overnight loans between 
banks. The Federal Reserve attempts to influence macroeconomic outcomes by raising 
and lowering the federal funds rate in response to changes in inflation, economic 
performance, and employment. In this paper, we analyze the impact of the federal funds 
rate on the relative unemployment rates of different social groups. The federal funds rate 
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economy as a whole. However, our panel data is disaggregated to the state level. 
Therefore, one challenge is to distinguish the impacts of macroeconomic policies that 
operate at the national level from regional economic dynamics that may operate 
independently of national policy and which vary from state to state. We discuss our 
approach to this problem in the following section. 
  
Data 
We assembled a panel dataset for each of the 50 states covering the period 1979 to 2008 
using four sources: the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS).
11 Annual labor market statistics, including state-level disaggregated 
estimates of employment, unemployment, and labor force participation by race, gender, 
and ethnicity, were calculated directly from the CPS source data for each year. The BEA 
produces state and national level estimates of GDP. The Federal Reserve was our source 
for interest rate data (the federal funds rate), and the BLS maintains the U.S. consumer 
price index, which we used to calculate annual nationwide inflation rates.  
  Merged CPS data on the outgoing rotation group were used to estimate the annual 
state-level labor market statistics, disaggregated by race/ethnicity and gender.
12 We apply 
the methodology developed by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) to 
classify individuals into four mutually exclusive racial/ethnic groups: White, Black, 
Hispanic, and other. Because of the small sample size in the out-going rotation group, 
reliable estimates of the unemployment rate for Blacks were not possible in states with 
very low Black shares of the state population. Since the construction of our dependent 
variable requires an estimate of the Black unemployment rate over time, we dropped 
states from our sample if there were more than 10 missing observations due to 
excessively small samples. This resulted in 12 states being dropped, all of which have 
very small Black population shares: Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.  
  To distinguish macroeconomic dynamics that affect aggregate output at the 
national level from state-specific changes in economic activity, we regressed state-level 
  12GDP growth on national level GDP growth using a simple fixed effects model. We then 
captured the residuals (both the random errors and the fixed effects components of the 
error term) and used these residuals as an indicator of state-level changes in real 
economic activity, removing the impact of variations at the national macroeconomic 
level. 
  Times series data potentially suffer a problem of non-stationarity, which, if not 
corrected, can bias results. We therefore conducted unit root tests for all variables. 
Detailed discussion of the methodology used is provided in the appendix, with test results 
summarized in Table A.1. We rejected the presence of a unit root in all cases. 
 
Analysis 
To estimate whether the reaction of unemployment to the federal funds rate differs 
between race groups, we use the panel dataset to estimate the following relationship: 
 
Uit
BWM = βo +β 1FFRt +β2LFPRit
BWM +β3gr it +β4BLSHit +β5BLSH
2
it +ηi +εit (1) 
 
where U
BWM represents the ratio of the total Black unemployment rate to the White male 
unemployment rate; the subscripts i and t index states and years, respectively; 





ratio of Black to White male labor force participation rates; gr is the state-level growth of 
output after the impact of national level growth dynamics have been removed; H and 
BLSH
2 are the Black share of the population and Black share squared, respectively; η is 
the component of the disturbance term associated with state-specific effects; and ε is a 
random error term.  
  We estimate a parallel equation to explore whether the reaction of unemployment 
differs between men and women: 
 
Uit
FWM = βo +β1FFRt +β2LFPRit
FWM +β3grit +β4BLSHit +β5BLSHit
2 +ηi +εit        (2) 
 
where the variables are defined analogously to those of equation (1), except that U  
refers to the ratio of the total female unemployment rate to the White male 
FWM
  13unemployment rate, and LFPR
FWM refers to the ratio of female to White male labor force 
participation. 
It is useful to consider potential endogeneity of two variables, the federal funds 
rate and relative labor force participation rates. With regard to the former, we deem 
endogeneity concerns to be negligible. The Fed is unlikely to propose national 
adjustments to the federal funds rate in response to state-level changes in the 
unemployment rate ratio, given the degree of heterogeneity among the states.  
In contrast, labor force participation rates may indeed vary inversely with 
unemployment, capturing the “discouraged worker” effect. Our motivation for including 
labor force participation as an explanatory variable is to correct a potential bias with 
unemployment rates as conventionally measured. Note that if high unemployment 
reduces labor force participation, standard unemployment rates underestimate the effect 
of monetary policy because lower labor force participation reduces measured 
unemployment. In that sense, our regression results produce a lower bound estimate of 
unemployment effects. More succinctly, the labor force participation variable addresses 
an issue about the measurement of unemployment; it is not a direction of causality issue 
(the usual endogeneity problem).
14 
Equations (1) and (2) directly incorporate the Black population share as an 
explanatory variable. Since the squared population share is also included, the relationship 
is non-linear. This represents one strategy for modeling non-linearities in terms of the 
unemployment rate ratios. However, the coefficients on the other variables, most notably 
the real federal funds rate, remain constant with variations in the Black population share. 
An alternative approach to capturing non-linearities in the responsiveness of relative 
unemployment rates to monetary policy decisions is to develop threshold models in 
which the coefficients themselves are allowed to vary when the Black population share 
falls above or below certain thresholds. 
  Therefore, we test for threshold effects of Black share of the population on 
unemployment rates. We anticipate that the estimated coefficients will vary depending on 
the Black share of the working age population. However, we treat the thresholds at which 
the structure of the relationships changes as unknown. Therefore, as a first step, we must 
estimate the thresholds of the Black population share at which the relationship between 
  14our macroeconomic policy variable, the federal funds rate, and differential race and 
gender outcomes changes. In other words, we estimate equations that are similar to 
Equations (1) and (2) above, but which exclude the Black labor share from the 
specification. Instead, we generate different estimates of the model for states whose 
Black population shares fall above or below particular thresholds. Specifically, we 
explore one-threshold and two-threshold models to determine which approach produces 
the estimates which best fit the data. 
  To maintain a minimum number of observations, we additionally required that 
any division based on the threshold retained at least 4 states. This requirement places an 
upper limit on our thresholds of approximately 28 percent. In only four states does the 
Black share exceed 27 percent: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. For 
the one threshold model, we estimate a series of equations, allowing the threshold, τ, to 
vary from a low of one percent to a high of 28 percent. For each value of τ, we estimate 
two equations – one for all states whose average Black population share falls below τ and 
one for states whose population share is greater than or equal to τ. The set of estimates 
with the highest regression sum of squares is taken as the best fit and determines the 
value of τ we use in this analysis. 
  A similar procedure is used in the two-threshold model, except that we have two 
unknown thresholds, τ1 and τ2. We allow τ1 to vary between one percent and 28 percent – 
again, imposing the requirement that each sub-group of states must contain at least four 
states. For each value of τ1, we allow τ2 to vary throughout a similar range as long as τ2 > 
τ1 for any given τ1. For each value of τ1 and τ2, we estimate three equations: one for states 
whose Black population share falls below τ1, a second for states whose Black population 
share is greater than τ1 but less than τ2, and a third for states whose Black population 
share is greater than or equal to τ2. Our estimates of the values of τ1 and τ2 are those that 
maximize the total regression sum of squares. 
  For the models with the Black to White male unemployment rate ratio as the 
dependent variable, we found that the two-threshold model had the best fit. The 
thresholds that maximized the sum of squares of the regression were 11 percent and 25 
percent. Table 1 reports these results and compares the regression sum of squares of the 
two-threshold model with those of the one threshold model and of a model with no 
  15thresholds imposed (using the same specification, but the full set of states with adequate 
data). In the case of the one threshold model, the threshold value that maximized the 
regression sum of squares was 25 percent. 
  Interestingly, the two-threshold model provides the best fit for the gender models, 
with the female to White male unemployment rate ratio as the dependent variable. The 
thresholds that maximized the sum of squares of the regression were 14 percent and 25 
percent. These thresholds are close to those from the Black/White male model. This 
suggests that structural changes that are associated with different Black population shares 
affect the estimated relationships in both the race and gender models at similar threshold 
levels. For comparative purposes, we also examined a two-threshold model for the 
female/White male relationship using the same thresholds from the Black/White male 
unemployment rate regressions (11 percent and 25 percent). The regression sum of 
squares is slightly lower than when the thresholds are set at 14 percent and 25 percent, 
but the difference is negligible. These results are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 2 presents the detailed coefficient estimates of the basic models and the 
two-threshold fixed effects models with thresholds of 11 percent and 25 percent for the 
Black/White male regressions and 14 percent and 25 percent for the Female/White male 
regressions. Columns 1 and 5 present estimates of the model without threshold effects as 
described in Equations 1 and 2 for relative unemployment rates of Blacks and females, 
respectively (with the Black population share entering as a non-linear explanatory 
variable and including. Columns 2-4 and 6-8 give results of the two-threshold models 
with Blacks and female relative unemployment rate ratios as the dependent variables, 
respectively (and with the Black population share omitted as an explanatory variable 
since it is used to determine the relevant thresholds). 
  Consider first the estimates of the determinants of the Black/White male 
unemployment rate ratio. Column 1 shows the estimated coefficients for all states. The 
constant term is 2.291, consistent with past research indicating the Black/White 
unemployment rate ratio hovers around 2. In addition, increases in the federal funds rate 
exert a positive significant effect on this ratio. Ethnic differences in labor force 
participation do not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, nor does the 
adjusted state growth rate. Interestingly, neither the Black share of the population nor its 
square is statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for states with a Black 
population share of less than 11 percent are given in Column 2. In this group of states, 
none of the coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception of the constant 
term. In particular, the coefficient on the federal funds rate is not statistically different 
from zero. Column 3 presents similar estimates for states whose Black population share 
lies between 11 percent and 25 percent. There is a positive and significant relationship 
between the real federal funds rate and the ratio of Black to White male unemployment in 
this group of states. A higher real interest rate tends to increase Black unemployment 
relative to White male unemployment. This relationship becomes even stronger when the 
Black population share exceeds 25 percent (column 4). The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is larger and remains statistically significant. These results are consistent with 
the threat hypothesis, whereby exclusion and discrimination against Blacks increases 
with a rising Black share of the population.  
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Table 2. Estimated coefficients of two-threshold model, fixed effects 
 
 
     Black/White  male 
unemployment rate ratio 
   Female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8)                      
Explanatory variables  Full 
sample 
<11% 11%  to 
25% 
>25%  Full sample  <14%  14% to 
25% 
>25% 
2.291  3.045  3.847 -2.179  0.245  0.318 2.798 -1.826  Constant 
(0.61)* (0.65)*  (0.60)* (2.41)  (0.31)  (0.15)*  (0.58)* (1.45) 
0.031  0.009  0.048 0.071  0.024  0.019 0.002 0.086  Federal funds rate 
(0.01)*  (0.01)  (0.01)*  (0.02)*     (0.01)*  (0.003)*  (0.01)  (0.02)* 
-0.610 -0.661  -1.869 5.900  0.695  0.901 1.776 4.169  Labor force participation 
rate  (0.62)  (0.75)  (0.67)* (2.82)  (0.40)  (0.12)*  (0.68)* (1.77) 
-0.701 -0.021  3.852 -0.304  0.131  -0.143 1.695 1.076  State growth 
(0.70)  (0.78)  (1.21)* (0.708)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.45)* (0.27)* 
7.608       3.695      Black share 
(6.15)       (2.04)*     
-11.255       -4.754      Black share squared 
(12.79)       (4.24)     
Number  of  states  38 21  13 4  38  27 7  4 
N  1088 595  377 116  1102  783 203 116 
Regression sum of squares  12.711  2.367  14.637  5.183  3.337  1.280  1.627  3.590 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates p-value less than or equal to 5%. 
 
 
Note that the coefficient on state-level growth dynamics (controlling for national-
level growth) is positive and statistically significant in states with a Black population 
share between 11 and 25 percent. This suggests that faster regional growth, controlling 
for national level growth, raises the ratio of Black to White male unemployment. In other 
words, the Black population experiences a disproportionately smaller boost to 
employment from regional sources of growth in states with a Black population share 
between 11 and 25 percent. Noting that the coefficient on this variable for the other 
threshold groups is negative, but not statistically significant, these results suggest that 
racially-based job exclusion does indeed depend on the share of Blacks in the population. 
  18  Turning to the female/White male results for all states for which we have 
sufficient data on Black unemployment in column 5, here, too, the coefficient on the real 
federal funds rate is positive and significant, though smaller than the size of the 
coefficient in the corresponding Black/White male regression. Note also that the constant 
term is substantially lower, and is not statistically different from zero. The only other 
significant variable in that regression is the Black share of the population. It is positive, 
indicating that the women’s unemployment rate relative to White males rises linearly 
with increases in the Black share of the population. This is consistent with a hypothesis of 
job competition, possibly due to the crowding of women and Blacks into a limited 
number of job slots, relative to White men. 
In the threshold equations with the female to White male unemployment rate ratio 
as the dependent variable (columns 6-8), we find that the federal funds rate variable is 
positive and statistically significant when the Black population share is below 14 percent 
or above 25 percent. In the middle range, this coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero. For states with a low (less than 14 percent) Black population share, the coefficient 
value is 0.019. This effectively drops to zero for states with a Black population share 
between 14 percent and 25 percent. However, for states with average Black population 
shares greater than 25 percent, the size of this coefficient increases to 0.086. Moreover, in 
states with Black population shares in excess of 14 percent, state-level growth dynamics 
exert a positive and statistically significant impact on the ratio of female to White male 
unemployment. Thus, similar to the impact of economic growth on Blacks, women seem 
to be last hired during economic upturns, at least in states with a Black population share 
greater than 14 percent.  
  Table 3 presents two sets of variations on the female/White male unemployment 
rate ratio equations. First, we impose the same thresholds (11 percent and 25 percent) as 
we applied to the Black/White male unemployment rate equations in Table 2 in order to 
facilitate race/gender comparisons. These estimates are presented in columns 1-3 in Table 
3. Note that the coefficient estimates on the federal funds rate variable behave in a very 
similar fashion to those presented in Table 2 with thresholds of 14 percent and 25 
percent. Interestingly, several of the coefficients on the remaining variables lose some 
statistical significance when the threshold changes. It is noteworthy that for the group of 
  19states with a Black share ranging from 11 to 25 percent, Blacks disproportionately feel 
the negative effects of contractionary monetary policy relative to White men, but this is 
not so for all women. However, the coefficient on the real federal funds rate increases in 
magnitude and becomes statistically significant for both Blacks and women when the 
Black population share exceeds 25 percent. This is interesting and may suggest that 
“threat” effects become stronger in highly heterogeneous populations with the negative 
outcomes of these dynamics felt by both women and Blacks when the Black population 
share exceeds a critical threshold. 
We should note that some caution should be observed in making these 
comparisons. That is because our two dependent variables represent overlapping groups. 
Black women are captured in both dependent variables, although to a much larger extent 
influence the size of the Black/White male unemployment rate ratio. At thresholds above 
25 percent, however, the magnitude of the negative effects of contractionary policy on 
Blacks and women is similar, with coefficients on the federal funds rate 0.071 and 0.086, 
respectively.  
  Table 3 also presents coefficient estimates when all 50 states are included. Recall 
that we dropped states from the sample because it was not possible to estimate Black 
unemployment rates for states with very small Black populations. This does not apply to 
women’s unemployment rates. Therefore, we can include the full set of states in our 
model of the female/White male unemployment rate ratio. Using the same methodology 
we discussed earlier, we find that the optimal thresholds again are again 14 percent and 
25 percent. Therefore, including the full set of states will only alter the coefficient 
estimates for states with less than a 14 percent Black population share (Equation 4 in 
Table 3). From the results in that table, we observe that the coefficient estimates are quite 
similar to those in Table 2. The coefficient on the federal funds rate retains its 
significance and is of approximately the same magnitude. The coefficients on the other 
variables also have the same signs and statistical significance, although the sizes of these 




  20Table 3. Estimated coefficients of two-threshold model, fixed effects 
 
   Female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
Female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio         
(All 50 states) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  Explanatory variables 
<11% 11%  to 
25% 
>25%  <14%  14% to 25%  >25% 
0.251 1.920  -1.826  0.595  2.799 -1.826  Constant 
(0.17) (0.47)*  (1.45)  (0.14)*  (0.58)* (1.45) 
0.016 0.012  0.086  0.016  0.002 0.086  Federal funds rate 
   (0.01)*  (0.01)  (0.02)*  (0.003)*  (0.01) (0.02)* 
0.942 -0.828  4.169  0.571  -1.776 4.169  Labor force participation rate 
(0.20)* (0.56) (1.77)  (0.17)*  (0.68)* (1.77) 
-0.122 0.912 1.076  -0.451  1.779 1.076  State growth 
(0.24) (053)  (0.27)*  (0.21)*  (0.68)* (0.27)* 
Number of states  21  7  4  39  7 4 
N 609  203  116  1131  203 116 
Regression sum of squares  0.769  2.000  3.590  2.234  1.469 3.559 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates p-value less than or equal to 5%. 
 
Robustness Tests: Controlling for education and employment concentration 
Gender and racial differences in unemployment may be due to processes that reflect 
gender and racial stratification in education and job segregation. For that reason, we carry 
out a robustness check, controlling for gender and racial differences in the share of 
respective populations with a college education and the relative shares employment in 
interest rate-sensitive industries. We identified construction and durable goods 
manufacturing as the primary interest-rate sensitive industries, following Thorbecke 
(1997), who employed impulse-response techniques to assess industry-level employment 
effects in response to federal funds rate shocks. State-level gender and race data on 
education and employment by industry are from the CPS, as discussed in Section IV.  
More specifically, the ratios of the percentage of the labor force with some 














  21where COLL ( ) is the percentage of Black (female) labor force participants 
with some college education relative to White males, % COLL is the percentage of the 
respective group’s labor force participants with some college education, even if they did 
not earn a degree. Using similar notation, the percentage of Blacks (females) employed in 
















where IND denotes the share of the respective groups employed in interest-rate sensitive 
industries, and the remaining terms are defined as for education.  
  We would expect a negative coefficient on the percentage of Blacks (females) 
relative to White males with a college education, if there are “ladder” effects in job losses 
during recessions whereby less skilled workers are the first to be laid off.
15 Conversely, 
as the share of employed Blacks (females) working in interest-rate sensitive industries 
rises relative to White male concentration in these industries, we would anticipate an 
increase in the corresponding unemployment rate ratio. This would capture the combined 
effects of job concentration and the negative impact on employment in industries 
sensitive to increases in borrowing costs. In addition to providing the means to conduct a 
robustness check on the federal funds rate variable, inclusion of the additional variables 
allows us to parse the mechanisms of stratification and employment disadvantage by race 
and gender into three component parts: discrimination in job access, educational 
inequality, and job concentration (or segregation). 
  We consider first the estimates of Black/White male unemployment rate ratios in 
Table 4. Column 1 shows the coefficients for all states for which there are sufficient 
data.
16 Coefficients on education and concentration in interest rate-sensitive industries are 
statistically significant, and, as expected, work in opposite directions. The Black/White 
proportion of college-educated workers has a negative effect on the unemployment rate 
ratios, suggesting that part of the raw unemployment gap is explained by White males’ 
greater probability of having a college education. The coefficient on the employment 
concentration variable indicates that as the relative share of Blacks employed in interest 
  22rate-sensitive industries rises, the Black/White male unemployment rate ratio increases. 
Controlling for these two variables, we note that the federal funds rate continues to exert 
a positive significant effect on the unemployment rate ratio, and is somewhat smaller in 
magnitude than in the regressions that do not control for education and job segregation 
(0.022 as compared to 0.031).  
 
Table 4.  Race and gender results controlling for education and job segregation 
 
     Black/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
   Female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)   Explanatory variables 
Full 
sample 




<14% 14%  to 
25% 
>25% 
1.583 2.332  2.453  -3.569  0.047 0.089  2.715  -1.48  Constant 
(0.98)  (0.85)* (1.25)  (2.06)  (0.34)  (0.15) (0.72)*  (1.37) 
0.022 0.002  0.035  0.057 0.022 0.017  -0.0002  0.070  Federal funds rate 
(0.01)*  (0.02)  (0.01)*  (0.01)*     (0.01)*  (0.01)*  (0.01)  (0.02)* 
1.330 -0.109  0.531 9.945 1.176  1.127  -1.184  6.009  Labor force participation rate 
(0.96) (0.94)  (1.25)  (3.14)*  (0.50)*  (0.27)*  (1.13)  (1.26)* 
2.064 2.772  3.545  0.141 0.105 -0.107  1.773  0.616  State growth 
(1.24) (2.02)  (1.80)  (1.43) (0.25) (0.23)  (0.45)*  (1.26) 
2.317      4.314       Black share 
(7.24)      (2.12)*      
0.0865      -6.068       Black share squared 
(16.89)      (4.35)      
-1.560  -0.860 -1.458 -2.678  -0.185  -0.040 -0.237  -1.067 
College education  (0.43)*  (0.84)  (0.37)*  (1.04)  -0.09  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.22)* 
0.400 0.579  0.421  -0.161  0.398 0.446  0.144  0.455 
Industry (0.19)*  (0.29)  (0.22)  (0.58)  (0.18)*  (0.17)*  (0.92)  (0.64) 
Number of states  34  17  13  4  38  27  7  4 
N  470  144 245  81  1102 783 203  116 
Regression sum of squares  17.093  4.124 13.041 7.389  4.221  1.567  1.627 5.268 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates p-value less than or equal to 5%. 
 
The threshold model results (columns 2-4) also indicate that the inclusion of 
education and employment variables does not significantly alter the significance of the 
coefficients on the federal funds rate, labor force participation, and state growth in the 
analogous models in Table 2 although the size of federal funds rate coefficients declines 
slightly. The education variable is only significant in the states where Blacks comprise 11 
  23to 25 percent of the population, while the job segregation variable is not significant in any 
of the thresholds models. 
The results from the gender regressions (columns 5-8) produce similar results to 
those for Blacks/White males. The higher the ratio of females to White males with a 
college education, the lower the unemployment rate ratio, while employment 
concentration of women in interest-rate sensitive industries relative to White men raises 
the ratio. The federal funds rate coefficients are slightly lower than in the restricted 
regressions (columns 5-8 in Table 2), but retain their statistical significance.  
 
V. Black Women, White women, and Black men: Is there a hierarchy within the 
subordinate groups? 
 
A challenge in assessing the role of gender and race as categories of stratification is that 
they overlap. Conceivably, our results on the negative effect of contractionary monetary 
policy on women could be capturing a differentially negative effect on Black women. In 
an effort to further refine our understanding of stratification dynamics, we re-run the 
regressions separately for Black and White women and Black men, all relative to White 
men.  
  The full results are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix. Our 
discussion here is confined to the effect of the federal funds rate on the unemployment 
rate ratio of Black and White women and Black men, relative to the White male 
unemployment rate. Table 5 shows results for the basic regressions as well as the 
regressions augmented with controls for education and employment. In all regressions, 
the interest rate effect is positive and significant. The size of the effect, however, differs 
systematically by race and gender. Recognizing that comparisons between all women and 
Blacks are problematic because Black women are members of both groups, we note that 
the impact of contractionary monetary policy weighs more heavily on Blacks than on 
women, regardless of whether or not job concentration and education controls are 
included.    
 
  24Table 5. Summary of federal funds rate effects by race and gender 
 
   Basic regressions 




All Black/White male  0.031* 0.022* 
Black male/White male  0.028* 0.029* 
Black female/White male  0.043* 0.039* 
White female/White male  0.019* 0.015* 
    
Coefficient ratios    
All Black/White female   1.84  2.00 
Black female/White female 2.26  2.60 
Black male/White female  1.47  1.93 
  Note: * indicates p-value less than or equal to 5%.  
 
  Disaggregating by race and gender, we observe that while Blacks 
disproportionately bear the costs of unemployment induced by contractionary monetary 
policy relative to White women, that burden is heaviest for Black women. These results 
are consistent with research that shows Black women bear an additional wage penalty 
due to the intersection of being both Black and female (Kim 2009). Figure 1 provides a 
visual representation of the differential impact on Black women and men relative to 
White women as the federal funds rate rises.  
 
Race and Gender Stratification: Substitutes or Complements? 
We posited that there may be a relationship between Black and female relative 
unemployment rate ratios, and in particular that female rate ratios might fall as Black 
population share rises. This would suggest that in states with relatively ethnic 
homogeneity, women would bear a disproportionate share of unemployment resulting 
from the negative impact of interest rate hikes on aggregate demand, relative to White 
men. But as the Black share of the population rises, we hypothesized that the job costs of 
contractionary monetary policy would be shifted to Blacks, consistent with threat theory.  
  25Figure 1. Impact of one unit increase in federal fund rates on Black and female 






  Figure 2 is constructed using the data in Tables A.2 and A.3 to compare Black 
female and male to White female interest rate effects as black population share rises. We 
score coefficients with a p < 10 percent as 0. At Black population shares below 11 
percent, the effect of a hike in the federal funds rate on the unemployment rate ratio of 
the subordinate group to White males suggests the following hierarchy: White male and 
Black females, followed by White females and then Black males. However, in states with 
Black population shares ranging from 11 percent to 25 percent, Black women especially 
and then Black men are substantially more likely than White women to be put at the back 
of the job queue, all relative to White men, when contractionary monetary policy is 
pursued.  At population shares above 25 percent, negative race effects dominate, with 
Black women experiencing more than twice White women’s unemployment penalty, 
  26relative to White men. It is also suggestive of the likelihood that job competition amongst 
White women and Blacks is accentuated, potentially due to job crowding. 
 
Figure 2. Disaggregated Comparison of Interest Rate Effects on Unemployment Rate 





We note, however, that only four states have Black population shares in excess of 
25 percent, and therefore focus on the trend of coefficients as population share rises from 
under 11 percent up to 25 percent. The results for this group of states suggest that 
racialized identity norms dominate, consistent with the threat hypothesis. Thus, at low 
Black population shares, White men, whether as employers or workers able to influence 
hiring and firing decisions, shift the burden of monetary policy induced unemployment to 
White women and Black men. But as the Black population share rises, the burden of 
unemployment shifts heavily away from White women and toward Blacks, both male and 
female. That is, racialized norms that gives Whites preferential access to jobs appear to 




  27VI. Conclusions 
We can conclude from this analysis that monetary policy is neither race- nor gender-
neutral. It weighs heavily on both Blacks and White women, with a significantly greater 
penalty for being Black. Racial and gender differences in college education and job 
concentration in interest rate-sensitive sectors do not explain away the differentially 
negative impact of monetary policy on Blacks and White women. The results presented 
here highlight that gender analysis, at least in the context of an ethnically heterogeneous 
society such as the US, requires attention to potentially differential effects by ethnicity 
that may be stronger than gender differences. 
  Another implication of our results is that the distributional effects of the Fed 
monetary policies should inform their decision-making. Given the long-term impact of 
unemployment on adults and their children (Darity and Goldsmith 1996), we might 
indeed be concerned about whether monetary policy contributes to the reproduction of 
poverty and inequality between Whites and Blacks, and women and men, in particular 
women who are lone mothers. The long-run negative effects of inequality have been 
established in a variety of studies. The Fed’s failure to note the distributional 
consequences of its policy actions may in fact contribute to long-run inflationary 






  28APPENDIX 
 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
We tested all the variables in our panel for unit roots using Fisher-type panel unit root 
tests with an augmented Dickey-Fuller specification applied to the individual cross-
sections. We used the Fisher test because our panel is slightly unbalanced due to 
occasional missing observations for certain race-disaggregated variables. As described in 
the main text of the paper, we dropped states with over 10 missing observations in their 
individual time series. Having done this, some states with low Black population shares 
still have one or two missing observations for particular years. Since other unit root tests 
(for example, Im, Persaran, and Shin) require precisely balanced panels, we used the 
Fisher-type test. 
 
  Table A1 summarizes the results of the Fisher panel unit root tests. The Fisher test 
assumes an AR(1) process in the specification of the underlying Dickey-Fuller 
specification. Columns (1) and (2) of Table A1 report the results of the basic Fisher test, 
with Column (2) incorporating a deterministic time trend. Columns (3) and (4) augment 
the basic Fisher test with an additional lagged difference term, with Column (4) including 
a deterministic time trend. 
 
  The results of the test show that the vast majority of variables are stationary (that 
is, have no unit root) across the different specifications. The ratio of the percent of 
college educated women to the percent of college educated White men (COLL
FWM) is 
trend stationary – that is, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root when a 
deterministic trend is included. The ratio of Blacks in interest rate sensitive industries 
(IND
BWM) appears to be non-stationary in the basic specification (Column 1), but other 
tests reveal no evidence of a unit root (Columns 2-4). The only variables with somewhat 
ambiguous test results are the ratio of women’s labor force participation rates to White 
male labor force participation (LFPR
FWM) and the ratio of White women’s labor force 
participation rates to While male rates (LFPR
WFWM). The panel is perfectly balanced with 
regard to these two variables, so we also performed the Im, Persaran, and Shin panel unit 
root test using various specifications. We rejected the presence of a unit root in all cases. 
Therefore, we assumed that these two variables were non-stationary for the purposes of 
our analysis. 
 
  The real federal funds rate is the only variable which is invariant across states. 
Therefore, we use standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests to examine 
the stationarity of this variable for the single time series. The tests reveal the real federal 
funds rate to be trend stationary – that is, the test statistic rejects the presence of a unit 
root in an ADF specification which includes a determinist trend. The ADF test statistic is 
-5.07 with a p-value of less than 0.002. (One additional lagged difference term was added 
based on the Schwartz information criterion). 
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Table A1. Fisher-type panel unit root tests, χ-squared test statistics (p-values in 
parentheses) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
U













































































































































Note: Column 1: AR(1) process, no deterministic trend. Column 2: AR(1) process, deterministic trend. 
Column 3: AR(1) process with additional lagged difference term, no deterministic trend. Column 4: AR(1) 
process with additional lagged difference term, deterministic trend. 
 Table A.2 Black women and men and White women’s unemployment, relative to White men 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates p-value less than or equal to 5%.
   Black  female/White  male 
unemployment rate ratio 
White female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
Black male/White male unemployment 
rate ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) (11)  (12)  Explanatory variables 
Full 
sample 








11% 11%  to 
25% 
>25% 
0.834 1.615 3.653  0.051 0.497  0.294  1.478 -0.725  3.716  4.274  1.899  0.249  Constant 
(0.636) (0.42)* (0.57)* (1.79)  (0.19)*  (0.17)  (0.22)*  (0.67)  (0.92)*  (0.84)*  (0.86)*  (1.54) 
0.043 0.007 0.052  0.113 0.019  0.0179 0.008  0.049  0.028  0.027  0.043 -0.022  Federal funds rate 
(0.01)* (0.01) (0.01)*  (0.04)*  (0.004)* (0.003)*  (0.003)* (0.02)  (0.01)*  (0.01)* (0.006)* (0.03) 
0.442 0.977  -1.887  3.097 0.526  0.680  0.977  2.147  -1.447  -1.948 -0.285  3.33  Labor force participation rate 
(0.48)  (0.49)*  (0.64)*  (2.07) (0.23)  (0.21)* (0.50) (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.89)* (0.27) (1.71) 
0.766 0.033 3.935  1.543 -0.211  -0.071  0.033  0.649  0.555  0.004  3.244 -1.942  State growth 
(0.59) (0.65)  (1.56)*  (1.27) (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.65)  (0.40)  (0.93)  (1.13) (1.11)* (1.16) 
15.071        0.358       -0.866       Black share 
(6.76)*        (1.47)       (8.8)      
-32.102        1.046      11.389       Black share squared 
(12.86)*        (3.51)      (19.53)      
Number  of  states  38  21  13  4 38 21 13 4  38  21 13 4 
N  1095  602  377  1102  609 377  116 1095 602  377  116 
Regression sum of squares  0.834  4.308  24.201  9.111  2.466  0.974  1.25  1.25  18.849  19.118  6.73  2.304 
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Table A.3 Black women and men and White women’s unemployment, relative to White men, robustness check 
 
   Black  female/White  male 
unemployment rate ratio 
White female/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 
Black male/White male 
unemployment rate ratio 













11% 11%  to 
25% 
>25% 
1.846 2.352 3.04  -0.183  0.375 0.037 1.508  -0.359 2.639  3.249 2.326 -0.171  Constant 
(1.15) (1.08)*  (1.13)*  (1.75) (0.22)  (0.19) (0.25)*  (0.82) (1.04)* (0.85)*  (0.85)* (2.16) 
0.039 0.020  0.052  0.068 0.015 0.014 0.006  0.041 0.029 0.038 0.016  -0.029  Federal funds rate 
(0.01)* (0.22)  (0.02)*  (0.01)*  (0.004)*  (0.003)*  (0.003)*  (0.23) (0.01)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.04) 
1.468 1.143  -0.254  6.72 1.082 1.023  -0.041  3.111 0.136 -0.285 1.118 3.606  Labor force participation rate 
(0.99) (1.17)  (1.30)  (2.27)*  (0.32)*  (0.32) (0.47)  (1.00)* (0.59)  (0.71)  (1.02) (1.52) 
2.065 2.424  3.3  0.091  -0.113  -0.111  -0.147  0.305 1.002 0.586 3.688  -1.969  State growth 
(1.23) (2.30)  (2.07)  (1.27) (0.19) (0.23) (0.32)  (63) (1.17)  (2.13)  (1.01)*  (1.22) 
7.342      0.694        0.985        Black share 
(7.76)      (1.45)        (8.64)       
-11.672      -1.304         8.305        Black share squared 
(17.25)      (3.58)         (19.48)       
-2.171 -1.63  -1.132  -3.652  -0.514  -0.205  -0.531  -1.127 -0.719 -0.515 -1.682 -0.175  College 
(0.51)* (0.79)  (0.47)*  (1.01)*  (0.20)* (0.24) (0.27)  (0.97) (0.27)* (0.29) (0.59)* (1.16) 
-0.009 -0.28 0.522  0.817 0.454 0.708 0.114  0.149 0.0831 -0.266 0.354 0.309  Industry 
(0.39) (0.35)  (0.71)  (2.91)  (0.12)*  (0.11)*  (0.19)  (0.32) (0.22) (0.27) (0.38) (0.49) 
Number of states  35  18  13  4  38  21  13  4 38  21  13 4 
N 475  149  245  81  1102  609  377  116 971 478 377 116 
Regression sum of squares  23.908  3.36  16.009  13.165  3.335  1.673  1.367  1.526  3.335  9.117  14.454  2.623 
 






Abell, J. (1991). “Distributional Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policy.” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 50(3): 269-84. 
 
Allport, G. (1954). On the Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books 
Azmat, G., M. Guell, and A. Manning. (2004). “Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates in 
OECD Countries.” CEPR Discussion Paper 4307. 
Beggs, J., W. J. Villemez, and R. Arnold. (1997). “Black Population Concentration and 
Black-White Inequality: Expanding the Consideration of Place and Space Effects.” Social 
Forces 76(1):  65-91. 
 
Blalock, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations. New York: Wiley. 
 
Blanchard, O., G. Dell’Ariccia, and P. Mauro. (2010). “Rethinking Macroeconomic 
Policy.” IMF Staff Position Note.  
 
Blumer, H. (1958). “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.” The Pacific 
Sociological Review 1(1): 3-7. 
 
Blumerg, R. L. (1984). “A General Theory of Gender Stratification.” Sociological Theory 
2: 23-101. 
 
Bobo, L. (1999). “Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological 
Approach to Racism and Race Relations.” Journal of Social Issues 55(3): 445-472. 
 
Bonacich, E. (1972). “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market.” 
American Sociological Review 37(5): 547–559. 
 
Boushey, H. (2009). “Infographic: The Importance of Women Breadwinners.” 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/women_breadwinners.html 
Accessed February 2010. 
 
Braunstein, E. (2008). “The Feminist Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society: An 
Investigation of Gender Inequality and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Issues 
42(4): 959-979. 
 
Braunstein, E., and J. Heintz. (2008). “Gender Bias and Central Bank Policy: 
Employment and Inflation Reduction.” International Review of Applied Economics 22(2): 
173-86. 
 
Button, J., and B. Rienzo. (2002). “Race, Gender, and Ethnicity: Competition for 
Employment Opportunities in Southern Cities.” Paper Presented at the American Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA.  
Carpenter, S. B., and W. M. Rodgers III. (2004). “The Disparate Labor Market Impacts 
of Monetary Policy.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23(4): 813–30. 
 
Chafetz, J. S. (1989). “Gender Equality: Toward a Theory of Change.” In Feminism and 
Sociological Theory, ed. R. Wallace, pp. 135–60. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans. (1996). “The Effects of Monetary Policy 
Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds.” Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1): 16-
34. 
 
Corzine, J., J. Creech, and L. Corzine. (1983). “Black Concentration and Lynchings in 
the South: Testing Blalock's Power-Threat Hypothesis.” Social Forces 61: 774-796. 
 
Darity, Jr., W., and A. Goldsmith. (1996). “Social Psychology, Unemployment and 
Macroeconomics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1): 121-40.  
 
Darity, Jr., W., P. L. Mason, and J. Stewart. (2006). “The Economics of Identity: The 
Origin and Persistence of Racial Norms.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organizations 60(3): 283-305. 
 
Epstein, G., and E. Yeldan. (2008). “Inflation Targeting, Employment Creation, and 
Economic Development: Assessing the Impacts and Policy Alternatives.” International 
Review of Applied Economics 22(2): 129-130.  
 
Ewing, B., W. Levernier, and F. Malik. (2002). “The Differential Effects of Output 
Shocks on Unemployment Rates by Race and Gender.” Southern Economic Journal 68 
(3): 584-599. 
 
Farkas, G., M. Barton, and K. Kushner. (1988). “White, Black, and Hispanic Female 
Youths in Central City Labor Markets.” Sociological Quarterly 29: 605-621. 
 
Forman, T. (2003). “From Pet to Threat? Minority Concentration, School Racial Context, 
and White Youths’ Racial Attitudes.” Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at 
Chicago. Mimeo. 
 
Fossett, M., and K. J. Kiecolt. (1989). “The Relative Size of Minority Populations and 
White Racial Attitudes.” Social Science Research 70: 820-835. 
 
Greider, W. (1987). Secrets of the Temple. Simon & Schuster. 
 
Grown, C. and E. Tas. (2010). “Gender Equality in the US Labor Markets in the “Great 
Recession” of 2007-2010.” Working paper, Department of Economics,  American 
University. 
 
Hartmann, H. (1976). “Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex.” In Women 
and the Workplace: The Implications of Occupational Segregation, eds. M. Blaxall and 
  32B. Reagan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Heintz, J., and S. Seguino. (2007). “Central Bank Policy in Anglophone Caribbean and 
the US: Implications for Unemployment by Gender and Ethnicity.” Paper presented at 
ASSA, January 5-7, 2007, Chicago, IL. 
 
_____.  (2009). “Federal Reserve Policy and Inflation Dynamics in the U.S.: Race and 
Gender Inequalities in Unemployment Outcomes.” Paper presented at the Eastern 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, New York. 
 
Holcombe, L. (1988). “Demographic Factors Affecting the Black/White Unemployment 
Differential.” International Journal of Manpower 8: S26-S74. 
 
Hoynes, H. (2000). “The Employment and Earnings of Less Skilled Workers Over the 
Business Cycle.” In Finding Jobs: Work and Welfare Reform, eds. R. Blank and D. Card, 
pp. 23-71. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Huffman, M. L., and P. Cohen. (2004). “Racial Wage Inequality: Job Segregation and 
Devaluation Across US Labor Markets.” American Journal of Sociology 109(4): 902-36. 
 
Hyclak, T., and J. B. Stewart. (1995). Racial Differences in the Unemployment Response 
to Structural Changes in Local Labor Markets.” Review of Black Political Economy 23: 
29-42. 
 
International Labour Organisation. (2008). World of Work Report 2008: Income 
Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalisation. Geneva: Author. 
 
Jefferson, P. (2005). “Does Monetary Policy Affect Relative Educational Outcomes?” 
American Economic Review 95(2): 76-82. 
 
Kim, M. (2009). “Race and Gender Differences in the Earnings of Black Workers.” 
Industrial Relations 48(3): 466-488. 
 
Krysan, M. (2007). “Perceiving the Metropolis: Seeing the City Through the Prism of 
Race.” Social Forces 86(2): 699-733. 
 
Lynch, G. J., and T. Hyclak. (1984). “Cyclical and Noncyclical Unemployment 
Differences among Demographic Groups.” Growth and Change 15: 9-17. 
 
Margaronis, M. 2009. “Europe Lurches Right.” The Nation, June 29, 2009. 
 
Mason, P. L. (1995). “Race, Competition and Differential Wages.” Cambridge Journal 
of  Economics 19(4): 545-568.  
 
_____.  (1999). "Male Interracial Wage Differentials: Competing Explanations." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23: 1-39. 
 
  33_____. (2002). “The Janus Face of Race: Rhonda M. Williams on Orthodox Economic 
Schizophrenia.” Review of Black Political Economy 29(4): 63-75. 
 
McCreary, L., P. England, and G. Farkas. (1989). “The Employment of Central City 
Male Youth: Nonlinear Effects of Racial Composition.” Social Forces 68(1): 55-75. 
 
Moss, P., and C. Tilly. (2001). Stories Employers Tell: Race, Skill, and Hiring in 
America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Nagel, J. (1995). “Resource Competition Theories.” American Behavioral Scientist 38: 
442-58. 
 
Pettigrew, T., and L. Tropp. (2006). “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact 
Theory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5): 751-783. 
 
Pollin, R., and A. Zhu. (2006). “Inflation and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Non-
linear Analysis.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 4: 593-614. 
 
Rives, J., and K. Sosin. (2002). “Occupations and the Cyclical Behavior of Gender 
Unemployment Rates.” Journal of Socio-Economics 31(3): 287-299. 
 
Rodgers, W., III. (2007). “African American and White Differences in the Impacts of 
Monetary Policy on the Duration of Unemployment.” Working paper, Bloustein School 
of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University. 
 
Seguino, S. (2003). “Why are Women in the Caribbean So Much More Likely Than Men 
to Be Unemployed?” Social and Economic Studies 52(4): 83-120.   
 
Standing, G. (1989).  
 
Stein, R., S. Post, and A. Rinden. (2000). “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on 
Racial Attitudes.” Political Research Quarterly 53(2): 285-303. 
 
Stratton, L. (1993). “Racial Differences in Men’s Employment.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 46(3): 451-63. 
 
Sundstrom, W.A. (1997). “Explaining the Racial Unemployment Gap: Race, Region, and 
the Employment Status of Men, 1940.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50: 460-
77. 
 
Tachtamanova, Y. and E. Sierminska. (2009). “Gender, Monetary Policy, and 
Employment: The Case of Nine OECD Countries.” Feminist Economics 15(3): 323-353. 
 
Taylor, M. (1998). “How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local 
Populations: Numbers Count.” American Sociological Review 63(4): 512-535. 
 
  34Thorbecke, W. (1997). “Disinflationary Monetary Policy and the Distribution of 
Income.” Levy Institute Policy Brief No. 38. 
 
_____.  (2001). “Estimating the Effects of Disinflationary Monetary Policy on 
Minorities.” Journal of Policy Making 23: 51-66. 
 
Wagner, U., O. Christ, T. Pettigrew, J. Stellmacher, and C. Wolf. (2006). “Prejudice and 
Minority Proportion: Contact Instead of Threat Effects?” Social Psychology Quarterly 
69(4): 380-90. 
 
Waldinger, R. (1997). “Black/Immigrant Competition Re-Assessed. New Evidence from 
Los Angeles.” Sociological Perspectives 50: 365-386. 
 
Williams, R.M. (1987). “Capital, Competition, and Discrimination: A Reconsideration of 
Racial Earnings Inequality.” Review of Radical Political Economics 19(2): 1-15. 
 
_____. (1991). “Competition, Discrimination, and Differential Wage Rates: On the 
Continued Relevance of Marxian Theory to the Analysis of Earnings 
and Employment Inequality.” In New Approaches to Economic and Social Analyses of 
Discrimination, eds. R. Cornwall and P. Wunnava, pp. 65-92. New York: Praeger. 
 
_____.  (1993). “Race, Deconstruction, and the Emergent Agenda of Feminist Economic 
Theory.” In Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics, eds. M. Ferber and 
J. Nelson, pp. 144-152. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Williams, R. M., and R. E. Kenison. (1996). “The Way We Were?: Discrimination, 
Competition, and Inter-industry Wage Differentials in 1970.” Review of Radical Political 
Economics 28(2): 1-32. 
 
  35  36
                                                
ENDNOTES 
 
1 There are since signs of a shift in policy stance, however. Influential IMF economists 
Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro (2010) argue for allowing 
inflation targets to rise from 2 percent to 4 percent during normal economic times, so as 
to create monetary policy space which would allow central banks to lower interest rates 
during times of crisis.  
 
2 The 2008 economic crisis in the US and globally may be interpreted as evidence that 
women do not necessarily fare worse during downturns. The crisis, which began in the 
housing sector and spread quickly to the durable goods sector, resulted in job losses first 
in male-dominated industries. This suggests that the nature of the downturn shapes the 
gender impact. That said, single mothers’ unemployment rates rival those of men in the 
US, and the Black male and female unemployment rates have increased more than that 
for White men (Boushey 2009; Grown and Tas 2010). 
 
3 Extensive research, both theoretical and empirical, however, has considered the role of 
gender and race in influencing job segregation and wage differentials. See, for example, 
Mason (1999), for a discussion of the impact of White male and White female 
employment density on individual wages.   
 
4 That explanation would appear to be contingent on the nature of the downturn, as 
evidenced by Hoynes’ (2000) study which found that the 1992 recession led to relatively 
uniform unemployment effects across skill levels. 
 
5 Some research comparing gender and race effects of output shocks has been published, 
however. Results show that male unemployment rates respond more negatively to 
unanticipated shocks than female unemployment rates. Similarly, Black unemployment 
rates experience a larger increase in response to an unanticipated output shock than White 
unemployment rates (Lynch and Hyclak 1984; Ewing, Levernier, and Malik 2002). 
Hyclak and Stewart (1995) provide econometric evidence that increases in aggregate 
demand result in larger declines in Black unemployment rates than White rates.  
 
6 The increase in unemployment, combined with ominous discussions of tax increases 
and budget cuts bolstered the political right in European elections in 2009. Election 
campaigns were marked by anti-immigrant messages linked to job shortages, with right-
wing parties making electoral gains in the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Great Britain, and 
Austria (Margaronis 2009). 
 
7 We are grateful to Patrick Mason for this observation (private communication, June 15, 
2010). 
 
8 Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analysis of intergroup contact theory studies leads 
them to conclude that although contact under a variety of conditions reduces prejudice, 
contact under unfavorable conditions may increase prejudice and tensions.   
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9 The anxiety-producing fears of competition may be real or imagined. Bobo (1999: 466) 
cautions, “Whatever economic or political struggles takes place between racial groups of 
necessity implicates a psychological attachment, not merely concrete resources. In short, 
racial conflict can never be purely material from the vantage point of group position 
theory.” 
 
10 See Seguino (2009) for empirical evidence on the role of religiosity in influencing 
gender outcomes. 
 
11 We also have a complete set of data for Washington, D.C. However, given the unique 
structure of the economy and the high Black share of the city’s population, we treat 
Washington DC as an outlier and do not include it in this analysis. 
 
12 We are indebted to John Schmidt of the Center for Economic and Policy Research for 
his expertise in developing these estimates. 
 
13 Unemployment effects of contractionary monetary policy have been found to peak at 
five quarters, declining thereafter (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1996). 
Nevertheless, we also ran regressions with current and lagged values of the real federal 
funds rate in order to capture any additional lagged effects. The sum of the coefficients 
on current and lagged values of the federal funds rate was comparable to the coefficients 
in the models with only the current federal funds rate. Results available from the authors 
on request.  
 
14 Were we to treat this as a standard endogeneity problem, one solution would be to 
identify instruments that are correlated with labor force participation but are uncorrelated 
the unemployment rate ratio. Given the difficulty of finding such instruments, the “cure” 
could bias results much more than using the basic OLS technique identified in equations  
(1) and (2) above. 
 
15 Jefferson (2005) explores the responsiveness of skill-based unemployment to monetary 
policy. He finds that relative educational unemployment (with less skilled unemployment 
rates in the numerator) responds positively to monetary policy surprises (interest rate 
increases), controlling for supply shocks and new technical ideas. Jefferson concludes 
that tight labor markets spur the job prospects of younger, less experienced, and less 
educated workers, as scrutiny of job applicants fall. Conversely, interest rate hikes that 
engineer declines in aggregate demand can be expected to reduce job opportunities for 
the less educated relative to those with more education. 
 
16 Recall that, due to a limited number of observations, Black unemployment rates could 
not be consistently estimated for states with very small Black populations. States with 
large numbers of missing observations were dropped. 